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Brandon L. Garrett* 
Immigration laws are not just criminally enforced against individuals, 
but also corporations. For individuals, “crimmigration” is pervasive, as 
federal immigration prosecutions are a mass phenomenon. More than a 
third of the federal criminal docket—nearly 40,000 cases each year—con-
sists of prosecutions of persons charged with violations of immigration 
rules. In contrast, prosecutors rarely charge corporations, which are re-
quired to verify citizenship status of employees. This Article sheds light on 
this unexplored area of corporate criminal law, including by presenting 
new empirical data. In the early 2000s, corporate immigration enforcement 
for the first time increased in prominence. During the Obama Administra-
tion, this trend accelerated, with a total of 101 corporate immigration pros-
ecutions brought, and record penalties imposed. Under the Trump Admin-
istration so far, however, there have been just seven corporate immigration 
prosecutions, and the only large cases have been legacy matters from the 
prior Administration. This Article does not suggest that workplace immi-
gration screening and enforcement, much less criminal enforcement, is de-
sirable. Instead, this Article explores how corporate charging dynamics 
may exacerbate tensions inherent in criminalizing immigration in the work-
place. This Article contrasts the mass prosecution of individuals, under 
strict zero-tolerance rules, with the leniency-oriented approach towards 
firms that carefully considers collateral consequences, to shed light on in-
ternally conflicted federal policy at the intersection of corporate and immi-
gration law. Now that the federal criminal dockets have become dominated 
by immigration enforcement, the problem of “corporate crimmigration” 
deserves more urgent attention.   
  
 
 *  L. Neil Williams Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Kerry Abrams, 
Sam Buell, Kate Evans, and Eisha Jain for conversations about this project and invaluable comments on earlier 
drafts. I thank Emma Roberts for excellent research assistance. I am grateful to Jon Ashley for his longtime 
collaboration in creating and maintaining the Duke & University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution Registry that 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Immigration and criminal enforcement are increasingly interconnected. In 
the past, immigration violations were treated as civil matters, without any crim-
inal component.1 Today, in the United States, “crimmigration” is the new nor-
mal: more than a third of the federal docket now consists of prosecutions of 
noncitizens who violated immigration rules, largely for unlawful entry and 
reentry.2 Immigration now consistitutes the largest category in the federal crim-
inal docket.3 In 2018, federal immigration arrests of noncitizens almost doubled, 
increasing by a massive 50,000 people, to 108,000 arrests.4 Immigration prose-
cutions increased 650% from 1998–2018, from about 13,000 to almost 100,000 
federal immigration prosecutions each year.5 There may be at any time, upwards 
of 50,000 noncitizens in federal custody at any given time, which constitute about 
 
 1. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137 
(2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–82, 1352 fig.4 
(2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th 
“Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REGUL. 639, 655 (2004); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That 
Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1819, 1858 (2011). See generally, Chacón, supra note 1, at 135, 137–43. 
 3. Eagly, supra note 2, at 1281–82; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-pub-
lications/2019/FY18_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/69WR-9TT5].  
 4. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1998–2018 2, 4, tbl.1 (2019); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 5, 7. 
 5. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at tbl.16. The increase was driven by a surge in illegal reentry charges, in the 
five federal districts along the U.S. Mexico Border. Id. at 1–2.  
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43% of the federal prison population.6 The scale of criminal enforcement against 
individuals occurs on a mass scale, although the criminal penalties themselves 
are typically small.7 
Corporate crimmigration, as I describe in this Article, or the federal en-
forcement of immigration crime against corporations, is a study in contrasts, as 
compared with criminal immigration enforcement against individuals.8 This Ar-
ticle is the first to explore the phenomenon empirically, by presenting original 
data concerning corporate immigration prosecution in the United States.9 As de-
tailed in this Article, and in the Appendix, corporate immigration prosecutions, 
while long uncommon, steadily increased in number until recently, when they 
noticeably declined.10 During the Obama Administration, corporate immigration 
enforcement notably increased, building on an early focus on corporate enforce-
ment in the George W. Bush Administration. Prosecutors brought a total of 101 
corporate immigration prosecutions from 2008 through 2016, and cases imposed 
large financial penalties and requirements that corporations adopt compliance in 
hiring practices.11 Under the Trump Administration, there have so far been just 
seven corporate immigration prosecutions, with the only large corporate case 
concluding as a legacy matter brought several years earlier by the prior Admin-
istration.12 
Corporate crimmigration raises very different policy concerns than corpo-
rate criminal law more generally, although there are common themes. In the area 
 
 6. ERO FY 2019 Achievements, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/ 
features/ERO-2019 [https://perma.cc/S9FN-UZ39] (“ERO’s Average Daily Population in custody reached 
50,165 in FY 2019, an increase of 19% compared to FY 2018. At times, ERO’s detention population exceeded 
56,000.”); see also Emma Kaufman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1380–87 (2019) (de-
scribing the rise in segregated immigration prisons). 
 7. Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1968, 1974–
91 (2020) (describing the Trump Administration focus on border enforcement, from which three notable policies 
emerged: a zero-tolerance stance for illegal entry, enhanced punishment for those who reenter after deportation, 
and forced separation of children from parents being prosecuted).  
 8. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367, 376 (2006) (“Immigration law today is clothed with so many attributes of criminal law that the line between 
them has grown indistinct. Scholars have labeled this the ‘criminalization of immigration law.’”). The vast ma-
jority of these prosecutions, as discussed further in Part I, are for illegal reentry, and not for worksite violations.  
See MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 22 tbl.18. 
 9. Preliminary findings were shared with the Washington Post and reported in August 2019. Renae Merle, 
As Workplace Raids Multiply, Trump Administration Charges Few Companies, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2019, 
4:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/09/workplace-raids-multiply-trump-administra-
tion-charges-few-companies/ [https://perma.cc/58ZL-TNXW]  (“Prosecuting corporations, as opposed to indi-
vidual workers or managers, for immigration-related offenses was also relatively rare during the Obama admin-
istration, but it has slowed further under the Trump administration, according to a database maintained by Duke 
University and the University of Virginia and data reviewed by The Washington Post.”).  
 10. Indeed, the same Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, describing the “Federal criminal justice response” 
to immigration, does not mention workplace violations or prosecutions against corporations in its data or lists of 
offenses, instead focusing on the far more often prosecuted reentry, illegal entry, visa, and alien smuggling of-
fenses. See MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 23.  
 11. See APPENDIX: FEDERAL CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS, 2001–2019 (listing these cases). 
 12. See id.; see also Merle, supra note 9 (“The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse 
University examined federal data for a one-year period—April 2018 through March 2019—and found that no 
companies were prosecuted for knowingly hiring undocumented workers.”).  
GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  8:06 PM 
362 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
of financial or white-collar corporate crime, for many years, critics raised con-
cerns that the justice system has allowed serious corporate crimes to go unpun-
ished as prosecutors offered, after the Enron-era scandals, deferred or nonprose-
cution agreements to corporations.13 I have described the practical challenges 
when prosecuting “too big to jail” corporations in a variety of contexts, including 
the challenges when charging corporate employees and managers.14 While the 
concern with regulating the financial system is not a common thread, there is a 
shared concern regarding individual accountability as compared with corporate 
compliance with the law, and a common theme regarding relatively more privi-
leged and less privileged actors in the economy. For large corporations, access 
to highly educated “specialty” workers through programs, such as the H-1B pro-
gram, is legal and has been relatively secure, despite recent changes to immigra-
tion policies.15 In contrast, immigrant workers in less high-paying jobs, such as 
in agriculture, construction, or food processing, may face immigration enforce-
ment, deportation, and criminal prosecution. Relatedly, in immigration law, the 
disconnect between corporate and individual enforcement is stark. Massive num-
bers of individuals are prosecuted, and detained prior to deportation, under non-
discretionary “zero-tolerance” policies operating at the U.S.-Mexico border.16 
The chances that an individual will be subject to immigration enforcement in a 
workplace setting outside of the border setting is low.17 Instead, it is a criminal 
arrest, even for routine traffic enforcement, that may trigger immigration screen-
ing; however, for that reason, even apart from employment screening, individu-
als may have strong reasons to avoid any contact with government.18 In contrast, 
corporations, employers, or managers are rarely charged with immigration vio-
lations, under policies that consider collateral consequences to them.19 Individu-
als that report abusive labor practices may be threatened with deportation by 
 
 13. Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 110, 143–44 
(2020). 
 14. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 
253-54 (2014) (describing range of “too big to jail” concerns with how organizations are prosecuted); Jed S. 
Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 
9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ 
[https://perma.cc/9PZ3-WQM2].. 
 15. See Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, New Immigration Limits Cause Anxiety in Families and Busi-
nesses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/trump-immigration-ban-covid. 
html [https://perma.cc/ZBW4-UDSD]; see also H-1B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and 
Development Project Workers, and Fashion Models, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis. 
gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-and-devel-
opment-project-workers-and-fashion-models (Mar. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9J5R-QGH4]. 
 16. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal 
Illegal Entry (April 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-
criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/DQG2-343J]. 
 17. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 1830. But see Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the 
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1128–29 (2009). 
 18. Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1467–68 
(2019). 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
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those same employers.20 Prosecutors may not reward whistleblowers with leni-
ency, as they typically do as a matter of policy and practice in other areas of 
federal criminal practice.21 
These are complex immigration and prosecution dynamics at the intersec-
tion of Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security practices, 
and they have received little attention. The recent decline in corporate immigra-
tion enforcement has recently received some scattered media attention, as high-
profile workplace raids, resulting in detention and prosecution of hundreds of 
noncitizen employees, have not resulted in charges for employers or firms.22 The 
Trump Organization has received scrutiny for employing undocumented work-
ers.23 Yet there is still little scrutiny of the dramatic disconnect between policy 
and practice of individual and corporate immigration enforcement by federal 
prosecutors.24 Thus, a more basic goal of this Article is to describe the evolution 
in corporate immigration prosecution, which itself has largely escaped scholarly 
analysis, and which has received very little public attention generally, except to 
a limited extent, when the Department of Justice first began to focus somewhat 
more on corporate enforcement in the early 2000s.25 As Juliet Stumpf, who can 
be credited with playing a central role in conceptualizing “crimmigration” not 
 
 20. Lee, supra note 17, at 1106–10.  
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. Richard Fausset, After ICE Raids, a Reckoning in Mississippi’s Chicken County, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/us/mississippi-ice-raids-poultry-plants.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6TG5-9PSB] (noting that the Mississippi poultry company is currently challenging searches and raids of its prop-
erties in court, and that no executives have currently been charged). 
 23. Mike Baker, Firings at Trump Property Cap Years of Purging Undocumented Workers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/31/us/trump-undocumented-workers-winery.html 
[https://perma.cc/RGM7-YCEP]  (“For years, the Trump Organization used undocumented workers to tend to its 
hotels, golf courses and other properties, even as Donald Trump railed against the threat of illegal immigration 
as both a candidate and president. This year, faced with a public reckoning after some of those workers came 
forward, the organization has been cracking down. Dozens have been fired. The company vowed to follow what 
was already a widespread industry practice of using E-Verify checks to confirm employment eligibility.”). 
 24. Regarding the challenges of prosecuting individuals in complex corporate matters, see SAMUEL BUELL, 
CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 128–30 (2016) and 
Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 823, 847–48 (2014). Regarding 
the relative lack of focus in immigration scholarship on criminal, as opposed to civil enforcement, see Eagly, 
supra note 2, at 1283–84.  
 25. There are more recent discussions of the importance of immigration rules in the corporate compliance 
literature, highlighting the need to ensure that systems are in place to detect unauthorized employees. See, e.g., 
Rajiv S. Khanna, Corporate Immigration Policy: Why, What and How?, PRAC. LAW., April 2016 at 44, 45 (“Not 
having a consistent and considered approach in dealing with immigration law exposes the employer and its man-
agement to criminal prosecution, civil litigation, corporate dissolution, loss of revenue streams, millions of dol-
lars in fines, hundreds of hours in lost man hours spent in defending governmental investigations and actions, 
loss of hired talent and loss of good will”); see also Thomas C. Green & Ileana M. Ciobanu, Deputizing—and 
Then Prosecuting—America's Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 
1204 (2006) (describing how, over a decade ago, federal prosecutions had “sought unprecedented penalties to 
resolve immigration investigations,” in early efforts to enforce immigration rules against organizational viola-
tors); Eric Rich, Immigration Enforcement's Shift in the Workplace: Case of Md. Restaurateurs Reflects Use of 
Criminal Investigations, Rather Than Fines, Against Employers, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2006), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/15/AR2006041501049.html [https://perma.cc/K53B-
FPW7] (regarding media coverage of workplace raids and enforcement at that time); infra Part III.C (describing 
more recent cases and coverage of them). 
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just as a phenomenon but as a field, has written, “[I]mmigration law and the 
criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.”26 
For corporate offenders, that crimmigration connection looks completely 
different, in the way that immigration law and criminal priorities intersect. Prior 
work has not examined trends in corporate immigration prosecution, alongside 
companion trends in individual immigration prosecutions. That corporations are 
even subject to criminal immigration laws has largely escaped scholarly notice. 
Most corporate criminal scholars have understandably focused on financial 
crimes, and most immigration scholars have understandably focused on the hu-
man costs of enforcement.27 Yet, the trends in corporate immigration enforce-
ment are not surprising from the perspective of corporate crime research and 
data. Corporate prosecutions are generally declining in the United States at the 
federal level, where the most significant such cases have long been brought.28 
Updated data from the Duke and University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution 
Registry, show how under the Trump Administration, corporate penalties have 
declined sharply, as have numbers of prosecutions of public companies and fi-
nancial institutions.29 
This Article does not take any position on the question of whether it is de-
sirable or sound to leverage corporations as immigration screeners to verify au-
thorization of employees. Indeed, there are many reasons to think, for example, 
that the federal databases that employers use to comply with screening mandates 
are error prone, and that the approach creates a range of poor incentives.30 A 
central concern is that criminal enforcement can magnify an abusive power dy-
namic that immigration screening creates between employers and workers. The 
 
 26. Stumpf, supra note 8, at 376; see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Deconstructing Crimmi-
gration, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 208 (2018).  
 27. I have previously briefly noted data on corporate immigration prosecutions in a book surveying the 
changing nature of corporate criminal prosecution. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 64 (noting ten deferred prosecu-
tion agreements with corporations for immigration violations); id. at 97, 210 (regarding prosecutions of both 
employees and the corporations); id. at 99 (describing the Postville raids and resulting corporate prosecution); id. 
at 264 (noting that while “[m]ore than a third of the federal docket now consists of prosecutions of noncitizens 
who violated immigration rules, including by entering the country without permission,” in contrast, “[f]ew em-
ployers are prosecuted for immigration crimes.”). I am not aware of other scholarship exploring this topic.  
 28. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 21. 
 29. See Garrett, supra note 13, at 110; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution 
Registry, DUKE U. SCH. L. & U. VA. SCH. L. [hereinafter Duke/UVA Registry], http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Gar-
rett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7TZ6-TKRL]. This 
registry aims to provide the most complete resource available on federal organizational prosecution, including 
declinations, acquittals, trial convictions, deferred and nonprosecution agreements, and plea agreements with 
corporations.  
 30. See Lee, supra note 17; Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (and 
Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 385 (2012). For a more detailed discussion in the context of the 
E-Verify system, see infra Part II.C. See also Kati L. Griffith, Response Essay, ICE Was Not Meant to Be Cold: 
The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the Workplace, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137, 
1137 (2011); Shelly Chandra Patel, E-Verify: An Exceptionalist System Embedded in the Immigration Reform 
Battle Between Federal and State Governments, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 453, 471–72 (2010). See generally 
Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for 
Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 348 (2001); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented 
Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 499 (2004). 
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role played by corporate immigration prosecutions and nonprosecutions in these 
power dynamics should be examined. Further, there are solutions that can at least 
reduce perverse incentives and disparities, such as by incentivizing and provid-
ing leniency to whistleblowing employees that report labor and immigration vi-
olations by employers.  
This Article begins descriptively, by examining which offenses in immi-
gration law apply to criminalize individual and corporate behavior. Part II de-
scribes that legal background and then the changing trends in federal criminal 
immigration enforcement policy and practice. Part III turns to the presentation of 
detailed empirical data, from 2001–2019, concerning federal corporate immigra-
tion prosecutions. Next, Part IV examines the implications of corporate crimmi-
gration for policy and practice. Under the current approach in which immigration 
and criminal enforcement are closely intertwined, and individual criminal immi-
gration prosecutions have reached record levels, it is important to examine 
whether employers are being treated in a comparative hands-off manner, while 
whistleblowing employees lack protection for their cooperation in reporting vi-
olations. This Article concludes by asking why individual and corporate enforce-
ment have diverged so markedly in the immigration area, what the long-term 
effects may be, as well as the implications for corporate accountability more gen-
erally. Now that the federal criminal dockets have become dominated by immi-
gration enforcement, the problem of “corporate crimmigration” deserves re-
newed attention.   
II. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE  
DEFENDANTS 
This Part summarizes the relevant immigration provisions used in federal 
prosecutions of individual persons and those typically used in federal prosecu-
tions of organizations, along with a brief summary of trends in such enforcement. 
The bulk of individual prosecutions are for unlawful reentry, while organiza-
tional prosecution cases focus on employment-related offenses.31 The focus here 
is on federal criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses; in addition, a large 
literature has described how federal immigration enforcement and deportation 
has focused on noncitizens who have been arrested or charged with state criminal 
offenses.32 Second, this Part summarizes how corporations are charged with fed-
eral offenses generally, including changes over the past two decades to the non-
binding guidelines that the Department of Justice has adopted to inform decisions 
whether to prosecution corporations. Third, this Part describes how ICE has 
 
 31. See Kit Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Federal Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, 92 DENV. 
U.L. REV. 863, 865 (2015); Nessel, supra note 30, at 401. 
 32. In Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2019, “ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) officers arrested 
approximately 143,000 aliens and removed more than 267,000.” U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS, supra note 6 (“More 
than 86% of those arrested by ICE had criminal convictions or pending charges.”). Many of these were driving 
related. See id. (“More than 74,000 convictions and charges for Driving Under the Influence.”).  
GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  8:06 PM 
366 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
changed its priorities regarding workplace enforcement, to focus less on work-
place raids and more on compliance and regulation of employers, including by 
emphasizing the use of the E-Verify database and paper audits of employers.   
A. Federal Immigration Crime 
Today, the most commonly prosecuted federal immigration crime is illegal 
reentry into the United States.33 There more than 10 million unauthorized mi-
grants in the United States, according to estimates.34 Many entered lawfully.35 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, for those who entered without lawful 
inspection, it is a federal misdemeanor to unlawfully enter the country.36 It is 
also a civil violation that makes such a person removable.37 It is a more serious 
federal offense to unlawfully enter following a prior removal order. Rather than 
a six-month maximum sentence for unlawful entry, for unlawful reentry, the sen-
tence can be two years in prison, and if the prior removal was on the basis of 
more serious criminal convictions, then the maximum sentence can be as high as 
ten or twenty years.38 Unlawful reentry is the most commonly prosecuted federal 
immigration crime, and 72% of noncitizens prosecuted each year are for unlaw-
ful reentry (first-time illegal entry is not commonly prosecuted).39 Those prose-
cutions are concentrated in the five federal districts along the U.S. border with 
Mexico.40 
One goal of the illegal reentry offense is to deter unlawful crossing at bor-
ders; another rationale is to focus on recent migrants and not on persons with 
more established ties to the U.S.41 The approach towards border enforcement has 
changed over the past two decades towards making far greater use of criminal 
and not just civil tools to combat unlawful crossing, primarily at the U.S.-Mexico 
border.42 The Department of Homeland Security has made referral for criminal 
 
 33. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 2 (“The five crime types for which non-U.S. citizens were most likely to 
be prosecuted in U.S. district court in 2018 were illegal reentry (72% of prosecutions), drugs (13%), fraud (4.5%), 
alien smuggling (4%), and misuse of visas (2%).”). 
 34. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW RSCH. CTR.: HISP. TRENDS, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2011/ 
02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/ [https://perma.cc/N6TM-ES27]. 
 35. Id.  
 36. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 37. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(6)(i) (deeming inadmissible an “alien present in the United States without being 
admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the 
Attorney General”). 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)–(b). 
 39.  MOTIVANS supra note 4, at 2; see also John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Rise in U.S. 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/us/22crime.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/GY3A-2AHG].  
 40. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 2 (“Federal arrests in the five judicial districts on the U.S.-Mexico border 
increased from 76,171 in 2017 to 126,293 in 2018 . . . .”). 
 41. David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient 
Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & POL’Y 411, 426 (2015).  
 42. Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 126–27 (2012); Kit 
Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Federal Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 863, 
877 (2015).  
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prosecution mandatory for these offenses since 2005, which in itself is a remark-
able criminal referral policy, that few agencies adopt in any setting.43 The De-
partment of Justice announced new policies, under the Trump Administration, in 
2017, prioritizing removal of any noncitizens arrested or charged with any crim-
inal offense, with no exceptions for any classes of noncitizens.44 Additional re-
lated policies announced in 2017 prioritizing the prosecution of immigration of-
fenses, for all federal prosecutors, and in 2018, announcing a “Zero Tolerance” 
policy emphasizing the priority for federal prosecutors in border states specifi-
cally.45 Under that policy, “to the extent practicable,” all cases referred by immi-
gration authorities in the federal border districts were to be federally prose-
cuted. 46  Under the Trump Administration, those criminal referrals by 
immigration agents to prosecutors dramatically increased.47 
There has been a focus on quantity of individual immigration prosecutions 
over the past decade-and-a-half, including a perception that when federal prose-
cutors have focused on serious immigration violations, and “organizational 
rights,” but not low-level offenders, they have been taken to task.48 In general, 
the average sentence for immigration offenses has been short, and it decreased 
in fiscal year 2018 from twelve to ten months, even as the numbers of such of-
fenses increased, to over 20,000 individuals convicted.49 Further, supervised re-
lease was ordered in more than half of immigration cases in fiscal year 2018, 
 
 43. Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
& Gov’t Affs., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec.), 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/05/03/secretary-janet-napolitano-senate-committee-homeland-security-and-
governmental [https://perma.cc/PS9Q-TLM3] (describing goal of “Operation Streamline” as to “increase the 
consequences for illegally crossing the border by criminally prosecuting illegal border-crossers”). 
 44. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immi-
gration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ95-83F2] (“[R]egardless of the basis of re-
movability, Department personnel should prioritize removable aliens who: (I) have been convicted of any crim-
inal offense; (2) have been charged with any criminal offense that has not been resolved; (3) have committed acts 
which constitute a chargeable criminal offense . . . .”). 
 45. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal 
Illegal Entry (April 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-
criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/DQG2-343J] (“On April 11, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions an-
nounced a renewed commitment to criminal immigration enforcement. As part of that announcement, the Attor-
ney General issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors and directed them to prioritize the prosecution of 
certain criminal immigration offenses. Today’s zero-tolerance policy further directs each U.S. Attorney’s Office 
along the Southwest Border (i.e., Southern District of California, District of Arizona, District of New Mexico, 
Western District of Texas, and the Southern District of Texas) to adopt a policy to prosecute all Department of 
Homeland Security referrals of section 1325(a) violations, to the extent practicable.”). 
 46. Id. For a detailed description of these policy decisions, see Eagly, supra note 7, at 1983–91. 
 47. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 2 (“There were 21 federal criminal immigration arrests per 100 apprehen-
sions by the U.S. border patrol in the southwest border patrol sectors in 2018, up from 12 per 100 in 2017 . . . .”); 
Eagly, supra note 7, at 1990–91 (“President Trump inherited a federal criminal system that already prosecuted 
huge numbers of immigration cases.”).  
 48. Johnson, supra note 42, at 871–72 (describing early-2000’s focus of the U.S. Attorney for Southern 
California). Regarding the increase in immigration detention facilities, see Kaufman, supra note 6, at 1401–08.  
 49.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 9. Ingrid Eagly provides a wonderful overview of trends in 
criminal immigration enforcement and similarly describes how since 2000, average and median sentences for 
illegal reentry have steadily declined. Eagly, supra note 7, at 1987 n.102 (“The average sentence also declined 
from thirty-six months in 2000 to only ten months in 2018.”). But the numbers of illegal reentry cases have almost 
GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  8:06 PM 
368 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
reflecting the fact that deportation would follow the sentence.50 A separate set of 
offenses relate to harboring, hiring, and transporting noncitizens, under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324.51 As the Second Circuit has held, harboring can extend to the knowing 
employment of unauthorized noncitizens.52 
Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), em-
ployers, in particular, are obligated to verify, using an I-9 form, that all employ-
ees hired are not unauthorized aliens, based on an examination of certain types 
of documents.53 For the first time, employers were prohibited from hiring em-
ployees not authorized to work and requiring them to screen for immigration 
status.54  Those I-9 forms must be retained by employers.55  Further, § 1324 
makes knowing employment of an “unauthorized alien” unlawful; the statute 
does not require employers to take more than reasonable efforts to assess the 
accuracy or validity of the documents that the employee provides.56 A range of 
civil penalties apply to violations of the Act.57 
The employment provisions of § 1324(a) also include a range of criminal 
offenses. They make it a misdemeanor to engage in a “pattern or practice” of 
knowingly hiring illegal aliens.58 The Act also makes it a felony to employ, dur-
ing a one-year period, at least ten noncitizens with actual knowledge that they 
 
tripled, from 6,415 in 2000 to 18,241 cases in 2018. Id. at 1988 tbl.1. Eagly notes that the decline in sentences 
may reflect both the advisory sentencing guidelines after United States v. Booker and increased awareness, as 
well as acknowledge by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, that the guidelines recommendations in immigration 
cases may be unduly harsh. Id. at 1989. 
 50. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 10. 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 prohibits, regarding a person who is an alien, and with knowledge or reckless disregard 
for the person’s lack of authorization to enter, (1) bringing to such a person the United States; (2) transporting or 
moving such a person within the United States; (3) harboring or concealing within the United States; (4) encour-
aging or inducing such a person to enter or reside in the United States (or engaging in conspiracy to do); and 
(5) hiring at least ten such persons for employment. See Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring 
Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 147 (2010) (examining the effect of the harboring doctrine on U.S. immi-
gration enforcement). 
 52. United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 573–74 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (codifying Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 101(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3365–68); see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (“The person or entity must attest, under 
penalty of perjury and on a form designated or established by the Attorney General by regulation, that it has 
verified that the individual is not an unauthorized alien by examining [certain specified categories of docu-
ments].”) 
 54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A). 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3), (b)(4) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the person or entity may 
copy a document presented by an individual pursuant to this subsection and may retain the copy, but only (except 
as otherwise permitted under law) for the purpose of complying with the requirements of this subsection.”). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1), (a)(2); Steiben v. Immigr. Nat. Serv., 932 F.2d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1991) (“In 
an effort to deter illegal immigration, Congress designed . . . [§ 1324a] to control the unlawful employment of 
aliens in the United States by subjecting persons or entities who hire unauthorized aliens to civil and criminal 
penalties.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, at 61–62 (1986) (stating: “[i]t is not expected that employers ascer-
tain the legitimacy of documents presented during the verification process,” and “[t]he ‘reasonable man’ standard 
is to be used in implementing this provision and the Committee wishes to emphasize that documents that reason-
ably appear to be genuine should be accepted by employers without requiring further investigation of those doc-
uments.”). 
 57. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(d)(3)(A). 
 58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(a). 
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are noncitizens ineligible to work, with a maximum sentence of five years.59 The 
Act provides for a felony sentence of up to ten years, if the person was part of an 
organization that transported groups of ten or more persons at a time across the 
border in a manner that endangered lives, or for certain violations done for “com-
mercial gain or private financial advantage. . . .”60 Section 1327 makes it a crime 
to knowingly aid or assist an inadmissible noncitizen who has been convicted of 
an aggravated felony to enter the United States.61 
A third set of immigration offenses, of high salience in workplace settings, 
relate to identity theft. It is a federal crime to possess or use false immigration 
documents or social security numbers.62 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines address 
immigration crimes specifically, with recent revisions to the smuggling, trans-
portation, and harboring guidelines.63 
But, as the Sentencing Commission reports, the vast bulk of immigration 
charges were for unlawful reentry, or unlawfully remaining in the U.S. without 
authority (82.4% of all cases), with much of the remainder (12.8%) being smug-
gling offenses.64 The employment offenses, which might more commonly in-
volve corporations, are not commonly charged.65 Workplace raids appear to have 
increased in recent years, after a decline during the Obama Administration.66 
Even a very large workplace raid, such as a raid that resulted in 280 detentions 
near Dallas, Texas, is extremely small as compared with the tens of thousands 
detained at any given time who are not arrested in any workplace setting.67 Thus, 
in fiscal year 2018, the Department of Homeland Security reported a record total 
of 158,581 administrative arrests, of which about 110,000 occurred in prisons or 
jails, while about 40,000 occurred “at large” in the community.68 The vast ma-
jority of those persons were arrested by immigration officers having already been 
 
 59. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A). 
 60. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 61. 8 U.S.C. § 1327. 
 62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (criminalizing possession or use of a false immigration document); 42 
U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) (criminalizing false representation of a Social Security number). 
 63. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON IMMIGRATION GUIDELINES 1–4 (2019), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Immigration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LR5F-Q2FN]. 
 64. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12. 
 65. See id. at 21. 
 66. Miriam Jordan, ICE Arrests Hundreds in Mississippi Raids Targeting Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/ice-raids-mississippi.html [https://perma.cc/FVS9-
UGQZ]. 
 67. Phil Helsel, ICE Arrests More Than 280 at Texas Business, Biggest Workplace Immigration Raid in a 
Decade, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ice-arrests-more-280-
texas-business-biggest-workplace-immigration-raid-n990766 [https://perma.cc/93NT-E2BV]; see also Jordan, 
supra note 66 (discussing examples of particularly large-scale workplace immigration raids); Natalie Kitroeff, 
Workplace Raids Signal Shifting Tactics in Immigration Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/01/15/business/economy/immigration-raids.html [https://perma.cc/MFY6-E4NC] (addressing 
recent upticks in workplace immigration raids but acknowledging they are not a common occurrence).  
 68. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS 
REPORT, 1, 2 fig.1 (2019), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/W78M-HSS8]. 
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criminally arrested and detained by local law enforcement.69 In the report de-
scribing these record numbers of immigration arrests, DHS described, how the 
“results clearly demonstrate that the increased enforcement productivity in 
FY2017 has maintained an upward trend, and that ICE’s efforts to restore integ-
rity to our nation’s immigration system and enhance the safety and security of 
the United States have continued to yield positive results.”70 That report nowhere 
discussed workplace arrests or enforcement against corporations. None of the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics reports regarding immigration criminal enforcement, 
cited in this section, discuss immigration charges filed against corporations.71 
Similarly, in fiscal year 2019, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced rec-
ord figures for individual immigration prosecutions.72 “These record-breaking 
numbers are a testament to the dedication of our U.S. Attorneys’ Offices through-
out the nation, especially our Southwest border offices,” said Deputy Attorney 
General Jeffrey A. Rosen at the time.73 That efforts directed at a “crisis at the 
border,” may then explain the lack of focus on interior and corporate enforce-
ment.74 
As discussed in the next section, the more recent data on corporate immi-
gration enforcement, similarly suggests corporate offenses are a declining en-
forcement priority. Thus, one explanation for the lack of focus on corporate im-
migration violations is the lack of focus on the employment setting more 
generally, in contrast to the focus on border crossing, for which the Department 
of Justice has adopted “zero tolerance” policies and dedicated resources, and the 
interior focus on arrest of individuals screened and identified by local law en-
forcement in jails.75 But, when workplace raids do occur, and they have appar-
ently increased recently, one also observes less focus on corporate employers.76 
That disconnect raises still additional questions about the relationship between 
immigration law, criminal law, and corporate crime. 
B. Federal Corporate Prosecutions 
In general, large-scale federal corporate prosecutions, for any criminal of-
fense, are a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back just over two decades. In this 
Section, I provide a thumbnail overview of the change to corporate prosecution 
practice in this section; a substantial literature has detailed the changes to policy 
 
 69. Id. at 6–7 figs.3, 5. 
 70. Id. at 14–15. 
 71. See, e.g., id. at 1–2; Motivans, supra note 4, at 20, tbl.16 (2019). The increase was driven by a surge 
in illegal reentry charges, in the five federal districts along the U.S. Mexico Border. Id. at 1–2.  
 72. Press Release, Off. Pub. Aff., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Department of Justice Prosecuted a Record-Break-
ing Number of Immigration-Related Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/department-justice-prosecuted-record-breaking-number-immigration-related-cases-fiscal-year 
[https://perma.cc/UJ53-2PCW]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 68, at 4; Garrett, supra note 13, at 110; Press Release, 
supra note 45 (announcing a zero-tolerance policy for criminal illegal entry). 
 76. See Jordan, supra note 66 (discussing increased immigration enforcement at business place but noting 
those arrested were employees, not employers); Helsel, supra note 67. 
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and practice that have transformed federal corporate prosecutions over the past 
two decades.77 While prior to the 1990s, large corporate prosecutions were rela-
tively unusual, when the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were adopted in 
1992, federal prosecutors had far clearer rules for how to criminally sentence an 
organization.78 The practice of charging corporations had become an increas-
ingly important and common practice by the end of the 1990s, as reflected in 
then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder’s memo setting out for the first time 
a set of Department of Justice principles for the practice of charging corporate 
defendants.79 
In the early 2000’s, a new approach gradually transformed the practice of 
corporate prosecutions, as the DOJ emphasized large-scale settlements using de-
ferred and nonprosecution agreements. 80  Such deferred and nonprosecution 
agreements became the mechanism of choice for prosecuting large public corpo-
rations during that time period.81 By 2015, federal prosecutors were charging 
large numbers of financial institutions, which had rarely been prosecuted in the 
past.82 Prosecutors began to use criminal statutes, such as the Bank Secrecy Act 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, that had been neglected in prior years, in 
organization cases.83 
The Department of Justice developed written policies concerning corporate 
prosecutions during this time period.84 The DOJ continued to revise an increas-
ingly detailed set of nonbinding principles for charging organizations, including 
in response to concerns that policies resulted in overly lenient settlements for 
corporations.85 These policies were incorporated into the U.S. Attorney’s Man-
ual.86 The Obama Administration policies emphasized investigation of individ-
ual corporate offenders, and sought convictions against banks, rather than always 
seeking out-of-court settlements.87 
 
 77. See generally Garrett, supra note 14 (discussing the development of corporate criminal responsibility 
in U.S. law).  
 78. Id. at 154–55. 
 79. Id. at 55 (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution during the 
1990s).  
 80. Id. (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution during the 2000s 
and trends in enforcement during that time); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 
853, 889 (2007) (describing rise in use of compliance and rehabilitative approaches towards corporate prosecu-
tions); see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: 
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006). 
 81. Garrett, supra note 80, at 886. 
 82. Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J.F. 33, 34 (2016) (detailing chang-
ing approach towards prosecution of financial institutions).  
 83. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 64. 
 84. Id. at 55. 
 85. Id. at 55–56.  
 86. Id. at 55.  
 87. Garrett, supra note 82, at 34–35; see Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, to Heads of Department Components & U.S. Attorneys, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/CW6J-VHD7]; see also Brandon L. Garrett, 
The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 61 (2016); Elizabeth E. 
Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 
101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 52 (2015). 
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Prior work has analyzed patterns in corporate criminal prosecutions during 
this time period, as well as the accompanying array of changes in DOJ corporate 
prosecution guidelines and practice.88 In recent years, a set of DOJ corporate 
prosecution policy changes, some beginning under the Obama Administration, 
but far more so under the Trump Administration, have softened corporate penal-
ties and enforcement, and as developed in recent work examining subsequent 
trends, the result has been a decline in corporate prosecutions and penalties.89 
The decline in corporate immigration prosecutions, then, can be seen as a com-
panion to the general decline in corporate prosecutions, in numbers as well as in 
the size of penalties. 
C. ICE Workplace Enforcement Policies and the Rise of E-Verify 
The change towards a system in which the workplace became a site of im-
migration screening was gradual, and it unfolded decades after the IRCA first 
required that employers verify immigration status in I-9 forms.90 As I will de-
scribe, by the late 1990s, early databases were developed  with which employers 
could seek to verify immigration status, rather than just depending on the paper 
documentation that an employee provided.91 It was not until the early 2000s, 
though, that workplace enforcement became a greater priority.92 Those enforce-
ment actions brought some of the first large-scale criminal actions against cor-
porate employers.93 Those efforts increased, though, under the Obama Admin-
istration, with the creation of the E-Verify database, permitting employers to 
more readily screen for work authorization than they could by just visually ex-
amining identification to fill out an I-9.94 The new database increased the obli-
gations of companies and brought with it a new focus on compliance, more au-
diting by immigration authorities, growing concerns about the accuracy and 
negative consequences of the new system, as well as growing corporate prose-
cutions in the immigration area.95 As Stephen Lee has explored, the process of 
deputizing employers as immigration screeners resulted in “our nation’s employ-
ers” becoming “a significant and significantly misunderstood group of immigra-
tion decision makers.”96 
 
 88. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 253–54. 
 89. GARRETT, supra note 13, at 109; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUST. MANUAL § 9-28.210 (2018); see also 
Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess & Robert Gebeloff, Four Takeaways From the Trump-Era Plunge in Corporate 
Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/trump-corporate-penalties-sec-
justice.html [https://perma.cc/DF68-NYZ5]; Rick Claypool, ‘Law and Order’ Trump Is Soft on Corporate Crime 
and Wrongdoing, PR WATCH (July 30, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2018/07/13374/law-
order-trump-soft-corporate-crime-wrongdoing [https://perma.cc/YC2J-X2FW].  
 90.  Lee, supra note 17, at 1105–07. 
 91. Id. at 1108 n.13. 
 92. Id. at 1129.  
 93. Id. at 1141.  
 94. Stumpf, supra note 30, at 383 n.9.  
 95. Id. at 384–85. 
 96. Lee, supra note 17, at 1105. For additional criticism, see, for example, Maurice A. Roberts & Stephen 
Yale-Loehr, Employers as Junior Immigration Inspectors: The Impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act, 21 INT’L LAW. 1013, 1014 (1987); Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through 
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As part of this focus on compliance, in 1996, as part of the Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRIRA), Congress mandated the cre-
ation of an employment verification database.97 In 1997, Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) released the first version of what would become E-Ver-
ify, a “Basic Pilot,” to allow employers to better conduct due diligence on 
employee identity information.98 A federal database was made available, to al-
low a company to check a person’s photo and social security number as against 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) databases.99 
Today, the E-Verify system will inform the employer whether a person is 
confirmed as “Employment Authorized,” or a “tentative nonconfirmation,” or 
“TNC,” after which an employer must review the finding with the employee; at 
that stage, the employee has eight days to contact the SSA and DHS, during 
which time the employer cannot take action; if finalized, a “Final Nonconfirma-
tion” is entered, only after which the employer is required to terminate employ-
ment.100 This system checks social security numbers, as noted, but it cannot en-
sure that the numbers themselves are legitimate; thus, a person could use a social 
security number that belongs to another. 
One of the first companies to volunteer to use this Basic Pilot early version 
of this system was the large poultry company, Tyson Foods, which uncovered 
violations and was prosecuted, after cooperating with a federal investigation.101 
Tyson Foods, along with three managers, was later acquitted in a criminal pros-
ecution.102 
Workplace enforcement became a greater focus starting in the George W. 
Bush Administration.103 In 2003, federal agents conducted workplace raids at 
over sixty Wal-Mart stores, and concluded that unauthorized employees were 
working at 1000 stores; the case resulted in a then-record $11 million civil pay-
ment, with an additional $4 million payment by contractors working with Wal-
Mart.104 At the time, the spokesperson for ICE explained, “we’re going for a 
 
Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2002); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193 (2007). 
 97. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104–
208, div. C, § 401(a) (1996); see also Chamber of Com. of the United States v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 
(10th Cir. 2010) (describing Basic Pilot program). 
 98. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 25, at 1216.  
 99. Id. at 1216–17. 
 100. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 392–93 (describing E-Verify process); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS., E-VERIFY USER MANUAL 111 (2018), https://www.e-verify.gov/e-verify-user-manual 
[https://perma.cc/4UYF-LFBX]. 
 101. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 25, at 1216–17. 
 102. See June D. Bell, Defense Wins of 2003: A “Less Is More” Strategy Clicks with Jury in Tyson Case, 
NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 26, 2004). 
 103. I note that in addition to employer accountability for hiring noncitizens not authorized to work, the 
Department of Justice also enforces Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, and 28 C.F.R. 
Part 44, which prohibit discrimination on account of citizenship status in hiring, firing, recruitment, or referral 
for a fee. 
 104. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 25, at 1214–15. 
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larger breadth of investigations and bigger civil settlements and criminal 
fines.”105 Even so, ICE also emphasized its goal to promote compliance at com-
panies: “This case breaks new ground not only because this is a record dollar 
amount for a civil immigration settlement, but because this settlement requires 
Wal-Mart to create an internal program to ensure future compliance with immi-
gration laws by Wal-Mart contractors and by Wal-Mart itself.”106 Thus, “ICE is 
committed to not only bringing charges against companies that violate our na-
tion’s immigration laws, but also working with them to ensure that they have 
programs in place to prevent future violations.”107 
In April 2009, under Secretary Janet Napolitano, DHS Guidelines issued to 
ICE field offices instructed agents “to take aim at employers and supervisors for 
prosecution ‘through the use of carefully planned criminal investigations.’”108 
At the time, individual enforcement had been the priority; for example, in 2008, 
while 6,000 people had been arrested in workplace raids, only 135 were employ-
ers or managers.109 Still additional corporate criminal cases were brought during 
this time.110 These Guidelines, titled a “Worksite Enforcement Strategy,” em-
phasized that the “prospect for employment” is “one of the leading causes of 
illegal immigration.”111 The Guidelines explained that: “Enforcement efforts fo-
cused on employers better target the root causes of illegal immigration.”112 They 
stated that: “ICE must prioritize the criminal prosecution of actual employers 
who knowingly hire illegal workers because such employers are not sufficiently 
punished or deterred by the arrest of their illegal work force.”113 In particular, 
the Guidelines stated that an “effective strategy” must (1) penalize employers 
who “knowingly hire illegal workers,” (2) deter employers “tempted” to do so, 
and (3) “encourage all employers to take advantage of well-crafted compliance 
tools.”114 This approach resembles the approach which, as described in Section 
II.B., has taken hold in corporate prosecution efforts more generally, and in a 
host of regulatory contexts.  Violating corporations were to be punished, but ef-
forts also focused on deterring would-be violators and incentivizing compliance, 
 
 105. Id. at 1215. 
 106. Id.   
 107. Id. at 1216. 
 108. For an overview, see Ginger Thompson, Immigration Agents to Turn Focus to Employers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/us/politics/30immig.html [https://perma.cc/PY2B-
SBAF] 
 109. Id. 
 110.  See, e.g., News Release, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, E. DIST. OF TEX., Justice Department and Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement Reach $4.5 Million Agreement with Pilgrim's Pride (Dec. 30, 2009) (discussing agree-
ment Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation to pay $4.5 million and adopt more stringent immigration compliance practices 
in exchange for investigation conclusion); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 
101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1853 (2015) (discussing criminal prosecution of individuals and corporations). 
 111. Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Director, Office of Investigations, to Assistant Director, Dep-
uty Assistant Directors & Special Agents in Charge, Worksite Enforcement Strategy, U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (Apr. 30, 2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/worksite_enforcement_ 
strategy4_30_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P9D-3YBL]. 
 112. Id. at 1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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using E-Verify, so that corporations can themselves prevent violations through 
their own procedures and due diligence.  
Some of that work would occur through administrative and civil tools.  Im-
migration violations are civil, and conversely, large numbers of individual de-
portations occur through substantial cooperation between local law enforcement 
and immigration authorities.115 Further blurring the civil and criminal lines, the 
FBI enters immigration information into its criminal databases.116 There is not 
the same cooperative relationship and effort to target employers.117 But, civil en-
forcement by immigration officers is routine.118 For example, ICE offices were 
asked to conduct Form I-9 audits, to assess the identify of workers at companies 
and check for irregularities.119 If ICE determines that an employer has violated 
the law and should be fined, it issues a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF).120 NIFs 
may result in final orders for monetary penalties, settlements, or case dismis-
sals.121 Employers who have engaged in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring 
unauthorized immigrants can also be criminally prosecuted.122 Civil fines were 
to be used where criminal prosecutions are not appropriate, as well as debarment 
proceedings against companies that hired illegal workers, preventing them from 
work on federal contracts.123 
The Guidelines also reshaped how enforcement efforts were to proceed, 
with a greater focus on corporations than in the past. Crucially, agents were in-
structed to “obtain indictments, criminal arrest or search warrants, or a commit-
ment from a U.S. attorney’s office to prosecute the targeted employer, before 
arresting employees for civil immigration violations at a work site.”124 They re-
quired that at least fourteen days before conducting a raid, the relevant field of-
fice notify ICE headquarters with information including a proposed strategy for 
prosecuting the employer.125 
The E-Verify system helped to make this new focus on corporate compli-
ance in immigration possible. As Juliet Stumpf puts it, “E-Verify represents a 
significant step beyond IRCA in entrenching immigration enforcement in the 
workplace.”126 In July 2009, all federal employers and contractors were required 
 
 115. See Stumpf, supra note 8, at 388–89; 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (authorizing Attorney General to enter 
agreements with state law enforcement to perform functions of immigration officers). 
 116. Stumpf, supra note 8, at 389; Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1086 (2004).  
 117. See Thompson, supra note 108. 
 118. See Memorandum, supra note 111, at 1. 
 119. Id. at 2. 
 120. Id. at 3. 
 121. See Form I-9 Inspection Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Aug. 19, 2019), https:// 
www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection [https://perma.cc/V528-GUN4]. 
 122. See Memorandum, supra note 111, at 2. 
 123. Id. at 2–3. 
 124. Id. at 2.  
 125. Thompson, supra note 108. 
 126. Stumpf, supra note 30, at 394.  
GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  8:06 PM 
376 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
to participate in E-Verify, a database created in the late 1990s that permits em-
ployers to verify identify of potential or current employees.127 The commitment 
was reiterated in 2013: “ICE will focus its resources within the worksite enforce-
ment program on the criminal prosecution of employers who knowingly hire il-
legal workers in order to target the root cause of illegal immigration.”128 The 
focus was not on large workplace raids, but rather on promoting compliance 
through prosecutions, I-9 inspections, civil fines, and debarment, as well as edu-
cational efforts.129 In 2012, then-Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano 
described how since the new policies took effect in 2009, “ICE has audited more 
than 8,079 employers suspected of knowingly hiring workers unauthorized to 
work in the United States, debarred 726 companies and individuals, and imposed 
more than $87.9 million in financial sanctions.”130 
The E-Verify system expanded the ability for companies to themselves 
conduct screening of employees, growing out of the earlier Basic Pilot database, 
by permitting rapid checks of employee social security numbers, where man-
dated by federal law for federal agencies and contractors, and by a growing num-
ber of states that have required at  least some employers to use the system.131 At 
its inception, it provided a way for corporations to assure compliance, where ear-
lier, they could not necessarily be expected to detect whether employee identifi-
cation documents were valid or not.132 Shortly after E-Verify was launched, 
then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano added, that “Employer enrollment in E-
Verify, our on-line employee verification system managed by USCIS, has more 
 
 127. See E-VERIFY, https://www.e-verify.gov (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P3GJ-7BMN] 
(“[A] web-based system that allows enrolled employers to confirm the eligibility of their employees to work in 
the United States”); see also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Secretary Napolitano Strengthens Em-
ployment Verification with Administration’s Commitment to E-Verify (July 8, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
news/2009/07/08/administration-commits-e-verify-strengthens-employment-verification [https://perma.cc/72 
WC-FL7R] (“Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano today strengthened employ-
ment eligibility verification by announcing the Administration’s support for a regulation that will award federal 
contracts only to employers who use E-Verify to check employee work authorization.”); THE WHITE HOUSE, 
BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM at 21–22 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHZ7-9FC2] (regarding 
the new approach making E-Verify mandatory). 
 128. Amy Sherman, Obama Holds Record for Cracking Down on Employers Who Hire Undocumented 
Workers, POLITIFACT, (July 3, 2013), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2013/jul/03/debbie-wasserman-
schultz/obama-holds-record-cracking-down-employers-who-hir/ [https://perma.cc/EJA9-MVLN]. 
 129. See id.  
 130. Written Testimony of U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano for a House 
Committee on the Judiciary hearing titled “Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security” DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (July 17, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/07/17/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-janet-
napolitano-house-committee-judiciary-hearing [https://perma.cc/6FES-6CGJ]. 
 131. E-Verify States Map, LAWLOGIX, https://www.lawlogix.com/e-verify-map/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/HT3Y-WYVS] (showing state E-Verify requirements as of 2019 by map).  
 132. For early work describing the costs and benefits of the new E-Verify system, see Danielle M. Kidd, 
Note, E-Verify: Promoting Accountability and Transparency in Federal Procurement through Electronic Em-
ployment Verification, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 829, 830 (2011); Carl Wohlleben, Note, E-Verify, A Piece of the Puzzle 
Not a Brick in the Wall: Why All U.S. Employers Should Be Made to Use E-Verify, Just Not Yet, 36 RUTGERS 
COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 137, 137–38 (2009). 
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than doubled since January 2009, with more than 385,000 participating compa-
nies representing more than 1.1 million hiring sites.”133 Secretary Napolitano 
added that they had “continued to promote and strengthen E-Verify, developing 
a robust customer service and outreach staff to increase public awareness of E-
Verify’s benefits and inform employers and employees of their rights and re-
sponsibilities.”134 Secretary  Napolitano noted, “More than 17 million queries 
were processed in E-Verify in Fiscal Year 2011, allowing businesses to verify 
the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States.”135 Further, they 
also launched the E-Verify Self Check program, a “voluntary, free, fast, and se-
cure online service that allows individuals in the United States to confirm the 
accuracy of government records related to their employment eligibility status be-
fore seeking employment.”136 
At the time, President Barack Obama emphasized:  
It means cracking down more forcefully on businesses that knowingly hire un-
documented workers…most businesses want to do the right thing … So we 
need to implement a national system that allows businesses to quickly and ac-
curately verify someone’s employment status. And if they still knowingly hire 
undocumented workers, then we need to ramp up the penalties.137 
Scholarship examining the use of E-Verify has been less sanguine, describ-
ing errors when it is used,138 whether it permits state regulation of immigra-
tion,139 or harms labor protections for undocumented workers,140 and whether it 
imposes costs on the population as a whole through a combination of “error, 
misuse, discriminatory effect, or a decrease in individual autonomy.”141 
Thus, with the creation of E-Verify, the Administration conveyed that en-
forcement against violating employers would increase as employers could be ex-
pected to adopt a higher degree of due diligence. The system focused far more 
 
 133. Written Testimony of U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, supra note 
130.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See the White House President Barack Obama, Strengthening Enforcement, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 
ARCHIVES, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/immigration/strengthening-enforcement (last visited 
Jan. 18. 2021) [https://perma.cc/674M-RJFZ]; Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Fixing Our Broken Immigra-
tion Systems so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-everyone-plays-rules 
[https://perma.cc/UT7U-XMHC]. 
 138. See Amy Peck, Latest Report on E-Verify: The Good, The Bad and the Unresolved, LAWLOGIX 
(Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.lawlogix.com/latest-report-on-e-verify-the-good-the-bad-and-the-unresolved/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZUL-QFD5] (describing errors as “still a way of life” for E-Verify users). 
 139. See Jaime Walter, Comment, Congressional Preemption of Work-Authorization Verification Laws: A 
Narrower Approach to Defining the Scope of Preemption, 45 U.S.F.L. REV. 289, 307 (2010).  
 140. See, e.g., Rachel Feller, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona’s Improper 
Legislation in the Field of “Immigration-Related Employment Practices,” 84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 304 (2009); 
Lora L. Ries, B-Verify: Transforming E-Verify into a Biometric Employment Verification System, 3 ALB. GOV’T 
L. REV. 271, 285–86 (2010).  
 141. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 385.  
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on private workplace immigration screening.142 While companies might expect 
that E-Verify would lead to fewer immigration raids, they may have also been 
subjected to more raids, based on E-Verify information, whether accurate or 
not.143 Whether it created a sound system or not,144 in response to the rise of E-
Verify, corporate employers played a growing role as immigration screeners. As 
described in the next Part, corporate prosecutions for immigration violations in-
itially increased under those new policies, centering on the E-Verify system. 
III. CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS 
This Part describes new data regarding corporate prosecutions generally, 
and federal corporate immigration prosecutions specifically. These data are gath-
ered from the Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry, which is the most 
comprehensive resource available regarding federal prosecutions of organiza-
tions, with a dataset that begins in 2001.145 As described below, while corporate 
immigration enforcement increased under the Obama Administration ICE work-
place policies beginning in 2009, in the past few years under the Trump Admin-
istration, such enforcement has notably declined.146 Nor is there evidence, as I 
describe, that administrative and civil enforcement has compensated for the lack 
of corporate criminal enforcement.147 
A. Trends in Corporate Immigration Enforcement 
These data collected concerning corporate prosecutions are reflected in the 
Appendix, which details all federal corporate prosecutions located from 2001–
2019, and which are available along with docket entries and the text of agree-
ments at the Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry. Summarizing these 
data, Figure 1 below displays numbers of corporate immigration prosecutions 
from 2001 to 2019. One can readily observe that beginning in 2005, corporate 
immigration prosecutions increased, as priorities at ICE and the Department of 
Justice changed. Following that time period, as described in Section II.C., the E-
Verify system accompanied new Guidelines and a new approach towards com-
pliance and enforcement for corporations, cementing the focus that began in the 
George W. Bush Administration on corporate enforcement. Following the 
Obama Administration, while trends varied, these corporate immigration cases 
 
 142. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 940–41 (2006).  
 143. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1091, 1098–100 (2008). 
 144. Regarding E-Verify error rates, see Stumpf, supra note 30, at 399 (“E-Verify underverifies. Database 
inadequacies and user error create erroneous failures to confirm a small percentage of employees who are work 
authorized. In 2009, 2.6% of employees screened generated a tentative nonconfirmation response. Of the total 
number of tentative nonconfirmations, between 22% and 95% were erroneous.”).  
 145. See Duke/UVA Registry, supra note 29. The Registry also includes pre-2001 deferred and nonprose-
cution agreements with organizations; the more complete collection that includes plea agreements, declinations, 
and trial judgments, begins in 2001. 
 146. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 147. See discussion infra Section III.D. 
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continued to be brought in larger numbers through 2014, which was a record year 
in terms of numbers of cases brought. One then sees a drop-off, below in Figure 
1, regarding numbers of cases brought per year. These data reflect the year in 
which a case was resolved, and thus, a case settled in a prosecution agreement or 
judgment in a given year may reflect an investigation initiated several years prior. 
 




The numbers of cases do not reflect the seriousness or size of the cases or 
the conduct involved. The penalties imposed in a case provide one measure of 
the severity of the conduct. The trend in penalties is slightly different than the 
trend concerning numbers of corporate immigration prosecutions.   
As Figure 2 shows below, total penalties spiked later, in 2017–2018, with 
several large cases brought in each of those years. This reflects the impact of a 
handful of cases with very large fines, as set out in the Appendix. As described 
in the next Section, although there were two large cases in 2017–2018, both were 
legacy cases from the prior Administration, that had been in development for 
many years. These trends cannot address whether in the investigation pipeline 
there are similar cases which may be settled in future years. But the drop-off 
suggests that there is, at minimum, a years-long slowdown in the resolution of 
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FIG. 2. CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PENALTIES, 2001-19 
 
 
In reviewing the types of companies prosecuted for immigration prosecu-
tions, one can readily observe common themes. Most are smaller companies, and 
the industries are typically agriculture, contracting and construction, food pro-
cessing, and smaller manufacturers. This is consistent with data on which indus-
tries are most likely to employ unauthorized immigrant workers; the industries 
are often lower paying and with relatively more dangerous working condi-
tions.148 
B. The Rise in Corporate Immigration Prosecutions 
Immigration enforcement brought during the Obama Administration as 
against corporate employers reflected the policy changes just described. In 2006, 
for example, federal agents conducted raids at forty shipping pallet factories op-
erated by IFCO Systems.149 Agents detained more than a thousand noncitizens 
and estimated there were thousands more—more than half of IFCO employees 
had false Social Security numbers.150 Managers were charged with immigration 
violations.151 IFCO paid almost $21 million in fines, including back wages and 
civil penalties, and agreed to take compliance measures, including joining the E-
Verify system allowing instant checks on employee social security numbers.152 
 
 148. JEFFREY S. PASSEL AND D’VERA COHN, PEW RSCH. CTR., OCCUPATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT WORKERS (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/11/03/occupations-of-unau-
thorized-immigrant-workers/ [https://perma.cc/9HGN-EP6D]. 
 149. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 264. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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In another case, WesternGeco paid $19.6 million in fines for submitting fraudu-
lent visa applications for workers on Gulf of Mexico oil vessels.153 It is common 
for recent corporate settlements to require that the company continue to use the 
E-Verify system; of course, for many of them, where the company was already 
using E-Verify, the provision suggests that it was not effectively prevent viola-
tions.154 Other agreements require a company to participate in E-Verify for the 
first time.155 
These cases can raise real practical challenges. For example, in May 2008, 
one of the largest immigration raids in history swept a kosher meatpacking plant 
in Postville, Iowa.156 More than 300 employees were arrested, and within days 
more than 250 pleaded guilty to immigration crimes.157 In expedited hearings in 
groups of five, they pleaded guilty to lesser offenses of misuse of Social Security 
cards, rather than the aggravated identity theft charges for which they were ar-
rested.158 The arrests and prosecutions were a change in federal practice; in the 
 
 153. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. S.D. Tex. (Jun. 16, 2006), https://2001-2009.state.gov/m/ 
ds/rls/67985.htm [https://perma.cc/376S-5L4X]. 
 154. See, e.g., ABC Professional Trees Services, Inc., Nonprosecution Agreement at 2 (May 14, 2012), 
https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/ABC.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDE9-
QWQF] (“It is further understood that ABC Professional Tree Services: (a) shall continue to use E-Verify . . .”); 
Advanced Containment Systems, Inc., Nonprosecution Agreement at 2 (Dec. 5, 2011), https://corporate-prose-
cution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/advanced-containment-systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GS 
6-3YYT] (“It is further understood that ACSI and its subsidiaries: (a) shall continue to use E-Verify . . .”); Atrium 
Companies, Inc., Nonprosecution Agreement at 2 (Jan. 6, 2012), https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.ama-
zonaws.com/media/agreement/atrium.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NJN-X622] (“It is further understood that Atrium 
Companies and its subsidiaries: (a) shall continue to use E-Verify . . .”). 
 155. Plea Agreement at 4, United States. v. Behrmann Meat Processing, Inc., No. 12-30156-DRH (S.D. Ill. 
Jun. 29, 2012), https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/Behrmann-Meat.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7KJ6-VW8X] (“The Defendants agree to participate in an ‘e-verify’ program . . .”); Plea Agree-
ment at 6, United States v. EuroFresh, Inc., No. 11-Mj-4007-6FE (Dist. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2011), https://corporate-
prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/EurofreshInc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q4M-P3JE] 
(“Additional compliance measures shall include . . . [d]ocumentation of E-verify and other checks done for each 
signed Form I-9[.]”); Settlement Agreement Regarding IFCO Systems, N.A., Inc. 11 (Dec. 19, 2008) (“Use of 
the Department of Homeland Security’s ‘E-Verify’ program for all hiring[.]”); Plea Agreement at 7, United States 
v. Triangle Grading and Paving, Inc., No. 1:14CR264-1 (M.D. N.C. July 8, 2014), https://corporate-prosecution-
registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/triangle-grading.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KXB-RMXP] (“The de-
fendant . . . agrees to take the following compliance measures . . . [u]se E-Verify continuously and comprehen-
sively . . . [p]rovide annual E-Verify and I-9 training to human resources personnel conducted by an independent 
third party subject matter expert . . . [i]mplement an employee hotline to report suspected instances of improper 
conduct related to I-9 and E-Verify compliance.”). 
 156. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Sarah B. Horton, From “Deportability” to “Denounce-Ability:” New Forms of Labor Subordination 
in an Era of Governing Immigration Through Crime, 39 POLAR: POL. AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 312, 
312 (2016) (“In expedited hearings, migrants, bound by handcuffs at the wrists and with chains extending from 
their torsos to their ankles, pled guilty to Social Security fraud in groups of five . . . .”). 
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past, deportations might have resulted from such a raid, but not added-on crimi-
nal charging.159 The prosecutions were the beginning of a trend towards far 
greater interior criminal enforcement of immigration offenses.160 
The raids led to action against the corporation and management, too, which 
also represented a new trend. A local Postville official complained, “They don’t 
go after employers. They don’t put CEOs in jail.”161 Yet, in that case, the De-
partment of Justice did bring charges against higher-ups, including the CEO, and 
the corporation itself, Agriprocessors, Inc.162 Unlike the cases against immigrant 
workers, which were fast-tracked and resolved using lenient pleas within days, 
resulting in deportations, this corporate case plodded along, underscoring the 
complexity of bringing such prosecutions.163 The CEO went on trial in late 2009 
and was convicted, but not of immigration-related charges, rather of bank fraud 
charges related to efforts to sell the company; President Trump commuted the 
sentence in 2017.164 The government eventually dismissed all of the charges 
against Agriprocessors, Inc. after the company went bankrupt.165 The company 
could not pay a fine before these dismissals occurred, because it was “an empty 
shell.”166 
C. Recent Trends in Corporate Immigration Prosecution 
Not only have the numbers of corporate immigration cases declined since 
2016, but so have total penalties.167 The decline in penalties is not as steep, how-
ever, because two of the largest penalties were recent: the Waste Management of 
Texas penalty of $5.5 million, imposed in 2018, and the Asplundh Tree Services 
 
 159. Id. (“The aggressive raid in Postville marked a departure from customary ICE procedure during 
worksite raids, which was to deport detained migrants without prosecuting them for immigration-related con-
duct.”). 
 160. Id. at 313 (“As the border has migrated inward, spaces of everyday life-including workplaces, homes, 
and neighborhoods-have become subjected to intensified policing on an unprecedented scale.”). 
 161. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99.  
 162. Press Release, FBI, Former CEO of Agriprocessors Sentenced to 27 Years in Federal Prison (Jun. 22, 
2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/omaha/press-releases/2010/om062210.htm [https://perma.cc/APP7-
YNR4]. 
 163. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99.  
 164. JTA, Trump Commutes Sentence of Agriprocessors’ CEO Sholom Rubashkin, JEWISH WEEK: FOOD & 
WINE, (Dec. 21, 2017), https://jwfoodandwine.com/article/2017/12/21/trump-commutes-sentence-agriproces-
sors-ceo-sholom-rubashkin [https://perma.cc/64SQ-JMVJ]. 
 165. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.; see also supra Figure 2.  
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penalty of $80 million (as well as an additional $15 million civil penalty), im-
posed in 2016.168 Both, however, were cases that had been in progress from the 
prior administration.169 
In the Asplundh case, three managers, including a vice president, had 
pleaded guilty to immigration offenses.170 The combined civil and criminal pen-
alty in the case was the largest ever in an immigration matter.171 The settlements 
concluded a six-year investigation.172 The company, in addition to paying the 
fine, described taking “immediate corrective action,” including having hired new 
compliance staff, adopted a new facial recognition system, and described its ef-
forts to end the practices, from 2010–2014, that resulted in the prosecution.173 
The Waste Management case had begun with searches in 2012 and indict-
ments of three managers in 2014, for a “scheme to employ undocumented aliens 
as helpers on waste trucks picking up garbage in and around Houston.”174 This 
was part of a larger pattern at the company, which, “hired manual laborers with 
little or no regard for their legal status for almost 10 years.”175 Nevertheless, the 
company was offered leniency; the U.S Attorney explained: “In considering 
whether to enter into such agreements, we must take into account the collateral 
consequences that a criminal prosecution would have on the company’s contracts 
with many municipalities across the country and the thousands of employees for 
the conduct of three managers at one operating unit in Houston.”176 Thus, collat-
eral consequences were a deciding factor in offering leniency to the company, 
which forfeited $5.5 million of its gains from the scheme, but which did not pay 
a criminal fine, and which did not receive a criminal conviction or an indictment, 
but rather a nonprosecution agreement.177 
 
 168. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Waste Management to Forfeit $5.5 Million for Hiring Illegal Aliens 
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/waste-management-forfeit-55-million-hiring-illegal-al-
iens [https://perma.cc/XY9A-L8QD]; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pleads Guilty to 
Unlawful Employment Of Aliens (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/asplundh-tree-experts-
co-pleads-guilty-unlawful-employment-aliens [https://perma.cc/ZGG5-S8DN] (“Today marks the end of a 
lengthy investigation by ICE Homeland Security Investigations into hiring violations committed by the highest 
levels of Asplundh’s organization.”). 
 169. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Waste Management to Forfeit $5.5 Million for Hiring Illegal Aliens, 
supra note 168; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pleads Guilty to Unlawful Employment 
of Aliens, supra note 168 (noting that the six-year investigation started in 2011). 
 170. Michael Rubinkam, Tree Company Asplundh to Pay Record Fine for Immigration Practices, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://apnews.com/685bfb24850f40909ab66688a862d148/Tree-company-
to-pay-record-fine-for-immigration-practices [https://perma.cc/BM5C-D4SM]. 
 171. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pleads Guilty to Unlawful Employment of 
Aliens, supra note 168 (“The $95,000,000.00 recovery, including $80,000,000.00 criminal forfeiture money 
judgment and $15,000,000.00 in civil payment, represents the largest payment ever levied in an immigration 
case.”). 
 172. Alicia A. Caldwell, Pennsylvania Company to Pay Record Fine for Illegally Hiring Immigrants, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2017, 3:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pennsylvania-company-to-pay-record-fine-for-
illegally-hiring-immigrants-1506713490 [https://perma.cc/BYZ8-NGLY] 
 173. Id. 
 174. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. S.D. Tex., Waste Management to Forfeit $5.5 Million for Hiring 
Illegal Aliens (Aug. 29, 2018), supra note 168  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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D. Civil Corporate Immigration Enforcement 
These trends regarding criminal enforcement do not include separate civil 
and administrative enforcement against corporations, however, and it would be 
possible for criminal enforcement to lag, but for parallel civil and administrative 
enforcement to increase. ICE reports that while workplace raids have increased 
dramatically, convictions of managers had remained constant.178 ICE also re-
ports, however, that I-9 audits, inspections which are directed at employers, have 
increased under the Trump Administration.179 
Civil settlements and penalties imposed on corporations, however, have ap-
parently followed a similar trendline as criminal immigration penalties. Civil im-
migration penalties declined in 2018, with civil penalties at $10.2 million, 
slightly higher than the year before, but fines, forfeitures and restitution down to 
$10.2 million from $96.7 million (a high figure due to the large fine in the 
Asplundh case, noted above, also a legacy case from the Obama Administra-
tion).180 These figures highlight that far larger civil penalties are paid each year 
than criminal in the immigration setting. There continue to be large civil settle-
ments, without a criminal filing.181 These data also suggest, however, that civil 
penalties may have also declined following the rise during the George W. Bush 
and then the Obama Administrations.182 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL LAW 
One set of implications of these findings shed light on corporate crimmi-
gration as a phenomenon and the trends in corporate immigration prosecutions. 
Thus, these data suggest that corporate immigration prosecutions have followed 
a similar path in recent years as in other areas in which the Department of Justice 
has widened the gap between more lenient corporate enforcement and larger-
scale individual enforcement. Such a strategy should be particularly visible in 
 
 178. Roy Maurer, Immigration Worksite Enforcement Surged in 2018, SHRM (Dec. 20, 2018), https:// 
www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/ice-immigration-worksite-enforcement-
surged-2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/R79U-FJPQ] (“Criminal indictments and convictions remained steady. In FY 
2018, 72 managers were indicted, compared to 71 the year before, and 49 managers were convicted versus 55 in 
FY 2017. But those numbers are expected to rise due to many ongoing investigations still in development, ac-
cording to ICE.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (“ICE opened 6,848 worksite investigations in FY 2018, which ended Sept. 30, compared to 1,691 
in the previous 12 months, and it initiated 5,981 I-9 audits, compared to 1,360 in FY 2017. Over 2,300 people 
were arrested at work in FY 2018―more than seven times the amount in the previous year.”). 
 181. See, for example, the settlement with the Seaboard corporation, involving a $1,006,000 civil fine, Ok-
lahoma Based Agri-Business Agrees to $1 Million Civil Settlement, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 7, 
2018), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/oklahoma-based-agri-business-agrees-1-million-civil-settlement 
[https://perma.cc/89KR-W2RV], or the settlement with Mu Sigma, in which there was a $1,600,000 civil settle-
ment accompanied by a smaller $900,000 criminal fine, Indian Management Consulting Firm Agrees to $2.5 
Million Global Settlement in North Texas for Visa Fraud, Inducing Aliens to Enter US, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/indian-management-consulting-firm-agrees-25-mil-
lion-global-settlement-north-texas [https://perma.cc/6AK2-EULE].  
 182. See Appendix. 
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the immigration context, given the massive numbers of individuals being prose-
cuted for immigration crimes, and the relatively insignificant numbers of corpo-
rations now being prosecuted for related crimes. Part III focused on the descrip-
tive: setting out an empirical account of these data on corporate immigration 
prosecutions. This Part turns towards the implications of these findings for policy 
and practice, as well as reflecting on the role that corporate immigration crime 
should play in our understanding of immigration and labor law. 
One lens from which to view these findings focuses more squarely on im-
migration law. Immigration enforcement in workplace settings is far less com-
mon than enforcement through local arrests and jail screening.183 Immigration 
enforcement had only recently become more of a priority in the corporate setting, 
as workplace raids became more common and the E-Verify system was adopted, 
before apparently slipping in its use.184 The new screening system imposes bur-
dens on individuals, and it imposes compliance burdens on corporations.185 
Whether the system accomplishes its goals in immigration law, is an important 
question and it has been developed in literature on E-Verify.186 A second lens is 
labor law. Whether the screening system burdens workers’ rights and discour-
ages reporting of unlawful labor and immigration practices is an important ques-
tion.  
A third lens focuses on corporate criminal law. Corporate crime has not 
been a field that has been connected to immigration law, even as criminal law 
and immigration are now understood to be deeply connected. One way to view 
this pattern is a focus by prosecutors on lower-level individual cases, minor 
cases, but neglecting the more serious violators, and indeed, not relying on lower-
level violators to secure cases against more serious violators. Indeed, the focus 
on individual immigration prosecutions may come at the expense of holding cor-
porations accountable for immigration violations. Perhaps the disconnect should 
not be a surprise; comments by Department of Justice spokesperson comments 
suggest that immigration is a top priority under the Trump Administration, while 
corporate enforcement is not.187 
One rationale for prosecuting corporate immigration violations is a de-
mand-side focus on discouraging migrants overseas. The April 2009 Worksite 
Enforcement Strategy emphasized that immigration enforcement must focus on 
the demand-side: employers willing to hire illegal employees, for economic 
gain.188 Thus, that new ICE approach emphasized that an “effective strategy” 
must: (1) penalize employers who “knowingly hire illegal workers,” (2) deter 
 
 183. See supra Section II.A, supra (discussing workplace enforcement); U.S IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
supra note 68 (discussing enforcement through local arrests). 
 184. See supra Section II.C (discussing the use of E-Verify in workplace enforcement); see also Maurer, 
supra note 178. 
 185. See supra Section II.C. 
 186. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.   
 187. Garrett, supra note 13, at 113–14, 137 (“[S]mall offender cases, though, may have crowded out efforts 
to tackle serious corporate offenders in complex individual and corporate cases.”).  
 188. Memorandum, supra note 111, at 1. 
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employers “tempted” to do so, and (3) “encourage all employers to take ad-
vantage of well-crafted compliance tools.”189 In doing so, ICE focuses on corpo-
rate compliance. Such an approach fits well with corporate enforcement ap-
proaches more generally, in which the goal is not just to punish individuals, but 
to hold organizations accountable, to promote compliance, and using civil inves-
tigations and fines where possible.190 Yet, the evidence gathered here suggests 
that the corporate accountability side has been neglected in recent years, and in-
stead the focus is on punishing individuals. Doing so suggests that the demand-
side approach is no longer a priority.  
Another way in which corporate immigration enforcement resembles other 
areas of corporate enforcement is that collateral consequences matter.191 Collat-
eral consequences are a key consideration for corporations charged with immi-
gration offenses.192 Collateral consequences may be a consideration for individ-
uals, in the context in which state criminal charges may or may not lead to 
immigration or other important consequences.193 By contrast, under the federal 
system since 2005, an automatic criminal referral policy was instituted for im-
migration offenses.194 Any additional collateral consequences of the added crim-
inal charge are intended, and required, on a blanket basis against all individu-
als.195 Thus, ICE notes: “ICE removed more than 5,700 aliens identified as 
family unit members, which represents a 110% increase in removal of family 
unit members compared to FY 2018.”196 Workplace raids, of course, also lead to 
separation of families, when noncitizens are detained.197 
The argument here is not that workplace raids should be a priority as com-
pared to border enforcement; no claim is being made regarding where or how 
immigration enforcement should be prioritized. Nor is the goal to suggest that 
criminal prosecution for immigration offenses is necessary and should be in-
creased; relying less on criminal tools may be very much warranted.  
Instead, I argue that the disconnect between corporate and individual pros-
ecution has real civil rights and labor consequences. As noted, the workplaces 
and companies that have been prosecuted are not white-collar offices with highly 
 
 189. Id. at 1. 
 190. See supra Section II.B (discussing the changes to corporate prosecution in the last two decades). 
 191. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See generally About: The National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL 
OF ST. GOV’TS, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/3B5T-HMWX]; Margaret Col-
gate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 126–27 (2011); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 
(2016); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, Silence 
and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009). 
 194. Securing the Border, supra note 43. 
 195. See id. 
 196. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 6. 
 197. Angela Fritz & Luis Velarde, ICE Arrested Hundreds of People in Raids. Now ‘Devastated’ Children 
Are Without Their Parents, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/ 
2019/08/08/ice-arrested-hundreds-people-raids-now-devastated-children-are-without-their-parents/ 
[https://perma.cc/K2YU-BQQH]. 
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paid workers who have significant negotiating power.198 As Stephen Lee has ob-
served, “unencumbered by the fear of being punished, employers can threaten to 
report workers for removal, whereas workers do not possess any similar ability 
to blow the whistle on employers.”199 Or as Michael Wishnie has noted, “a law-
breaking employer may invoke the formidable powers of the government’s law 
enforcement apparatus to terrorize its workers and suppress worker dissent under 
threat of deportation.”200 Indeed, federal courts have noted as much, when em-
ployees have brought discrimination suits; the Ninth Circuit noted, for example, 
that by immigration screening, employers could “raise implicitly the threat of 
deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or un-
documented, reports illegal practices.”201 
The criminalization of immigration law has heightened those concerns; 
workers can fear both deportation and criminal prosecution, while the employer 
may increasingly go unpenalized criminally. Indeed, the IRCA not only created 
federal obligations to screen for immigration status, but it also preempted any 
state law consequences, civil or criminal, for employers.202 The Postville raids 
also provide a further example of this problem, where although the employer was 
eventually prosecuted, abusive employment practices persisted for years because 
employees were told that “they were going to call immigration if we com-
plained.”203 Thus, as Stephen Lee has argued, it might be far more protective of 
employee rights for labor agencies to be involved in policing these workplaces, 
rather than immigration screening being the primary vehicle for regulation.204 
At the very least, clear policies could be put into place to reward with leni-
ency or as whistleblowers, employees who report illegal employment prac-
tices.205 While it is beyond the scope of this Article, and excellent research and 
policy has analyzed the tension between immigration enforcement and worker’s 
rights, the goal here is to describe how the competing interests in immigration 
 
 198. See supra Section III.A. 
 199. Lee, supra note 17, at 1106. 
 200. Wishnie, supra note 96, at 216.  
 201.  Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). For extensive citation to cases in which 
employers reported employees to immigration authorities only when they attempted to recover unpaid wages, 
see Lee, supra note 30, at 1121 n.61. 
 202. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The provisions of [IRCA] preempt any State or local law imposing civil or 
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for 
a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”). 
 203. Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/us/27immig.html [https://perma.cc/D494-B5UQ]. 
 204. Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (2011) (“First, 
why has the Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to protect unauthorized 
workers against exploitive practices despite the scope and seriousness of the problem? And second why has ICE, 
our nation’s top immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the labor consequences of their 
actions?”). 
 205. For example, victims of trafficking can receive temporary visas to permit them to cooperate in prose-
cutions. These are temporary visas, created under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, which 
provide to the victims of certain crimes in exchange for help prosecuting the perpetrator. See Victims of Traf-
ficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. 1534 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101). Further, informants are generally rewarded as cooperating witnesses in a wide 
variety of federal criminal matters, including corporate cases.  See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 14, at 247.  
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and labor policy are not improved by the addition of federal prosecutors.206 In-
stead, criminal prosecutions have heightened the imbalance of power between 
employer and employee, corporation and individual. 
An additional goal here is to describe an imbalance in resources and prior-
ities. The trends can be summarized by noting how resources have been power-
fully directed for prosecutions of individual for immigration offenses, whether 
at the border or in interior enforcement, but not towards corporate offenses, even 
where corporate offenders may violate the law on a greater scale. Thus, the 
Southern District of Texas recently received thirty-five new Assistant U.S. At-
torney positions to increase prosecutions of “improper entry, illegal reentry and 
alien smuggling cases,” all involving individual immigration prosecutions, and 
not corporate immigration cases.207 Such policies do not exist in other federal 
criminal areas, but again, these policies seem to apply to noncitizens and not to 
employees and supervisors at employers that violate immigration laws. 
That said, it is also possible that priorities will change over time, or that 
new corporate immigration cases in progress will eventually shift these observed 
corporate criminal enforcement patterns. In response to the Washington Post 
story reporting preliminary data from this study, the Administration stated that, 
“Oftentimes, those audits and inspections are the beginning of a lengthy process 
that could potentially lead to criminal charges, if sufficient evidence of criminal 
activity is discovered.”208 For now, those cases have not appeared in the pipeline, 
as cases from the prior Administration have been resolved.209 It appears that both 
civil and criminal enforcement have declined.210 Further, it would be consistent 
with the Administration’s approach in corporate prosecutions generally if audits 
and inspections did not tend to result in corporate referrals or prosecutions for 
corporations.211 
There is nothing resembling a zero-tolerance policy for corporate immigra-
tion violators, in immigration cases, or in any other of federal criminal law. De-
tailed leniency policies, set out in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual and revised over 
two decades, now apply to corporations.212 No such considerations apply to any 
group of individuals, and certainly not in the area of immigration enforcement, 
where one might instead expect that real value could arise from rewarding with 
leniency and protection, the employees who report illegal employment practices. 
Thus, one goal in examining corporate immigration prosecutions is to illustrate 
 
 206. See Lee supra note 204, at 1093 n.14 (“Similar questions concerning mission orientation, enforcement 
discretion, and unauthorized migration could be posed of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.”); id. at 1133 n.174 (“It is 
worth noting that a second and related monitoring challenge grows out of the increase in federal prosecutions of 
immigration crimes.”); see also Rebecca Smith, Ana Ana Avendaño, Julia Martínez Ortega, Iced Out: How Im-
migration Enforcement Has Interfered With Workers’ Rights, AFL-CIO, 15–28 (2009). 
 207. Press Release, Department of Justice, AG Sessions Selects SDTX to Receive Additional Resources to 
Combat the Southwest Border Crisis (May 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/ag-sessions-selects-
sdtx-receive-additional-resources-combat-southwest-border-crisis [https://perma.cc/9Q5H-XDNV]. 
 208. Merle, supra note 9. 
 209. See Appendix.  
 210. See Appendix.  
 211. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 212. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.  
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the glaring mismatch and collision of systems, priorities and federal agencies, in 
the use of policies adapted for the largest corporations, in a context in which the 
largest populations of individuals are subjected to federal criminal enforcement 
by U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Department of Justice, as well as civil immi-
gration consequences, by ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. No 
matter what one’s preferred view of either immigration, labor policy, or corpo-
rate enforcement, the goals of none of those systems seems well accomplished 
by these conflicted approaches. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While immigration law and criminal law have become intertwined, and a 
field of “crimmigration” law now explores that intersection, corporate crime has 
not been connected to immigration law in workplaces. Corporate crimmigration 
should matter, as policy shifts and enforcement patterns have altered the rela-
tionship between corporations, employers, managers, and workers. At the same 
time as the tensions between labor and immigration policies have sharpened, the 
federal policy and practice of prosecuting individuals for immigration crimes 
(largely regarding illegal entry and reentry at the border) could not be more dif-
ferent than the policies concerning interior enforcement, and within that category 
of enforcement (which largely relies on state and local criminal arrests to identify 
individuals), the practices concerning prosecutions of corporations are quite dis-
tinct. The story of corporate immigration prosecution is a recent story, accompa-
nying the rise of E-Verify and employer verification requirements, but the 
changes described have also occurred during a time of deep change in both im-
migration policy and corporate prosecution policy.  
The goal of this Article is to provide a different look at what has changed, 
by focusing on the prosecution of corporations for the most serious, criminal, 
immigration violations. Doing so sheds light on the complex and changing pri-
orities in both our immigration and criminal enforcement systems. During the 
same time period, in the past two decades, immigration law has become deeply 
connected to criminal enforcement. As Juliet Stumpf observed, as “criminal 
sanctions for immigration-related conduct and criminal grounds for removal 
from the United States continue to expand, aliens become synonymous with 
criminals.”213 Yet, while immigration enforcement has become far more punitive 
and prosecution-focused, at the border and also in the interior, the same has not 
been true for employers, even when they do commit criminal immigration viola-
tions. Just as corporations cannot be jailed, they cannot be deported or expelled. 
But they can be subject to fines and other penalties. For a time, the Department 
of Justice did focus on corporate enforcement, particularly on the heels of the 
launch of the E-Verify system, when compliance combined with the protection 
of worker rights seemed to at least be a goal, if not the practice. More recently, 
that trend reversed, as documented in this Article. As cases and penalties decline 
 
 213. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 367, 419 (2006). 
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for corporations for employer-side immigration violations, the prosecutions for 
individuals reached record levels, and workplace raids persist.  
Taking as a starting place that criminal enforcement of immigration laws is 
currently pursued, this Article describes the complex set of policies and practices 
that have resulted. The goals of immigration enforcement, its effects on human 
and labor rights, and immigration enforcement harnessed to criminal enforce-
ment, including the prosecution of corporations, each remain in conflict. To the 
extent that the Department of Justice is involved in immigration prosecutions, 
the Department should aim to correct the imbalance as between corporations and 
individuals. It is a basic precept of white-collar enforcement that individuals who 
cooperate and bring criminal lawbreaking to light should be rewarded, including 
through leniency, and not higher-ups or corporations who themselves violated 
the law. If workplace enforcement is to be a priority, a criminal law perspective 
also suggests that focusing on large-scale and serious violators should be the fo-
cus of enforcement resources, not en masse and “zero tolerance” prosecutions in 
minor cases.  
The gap between individual and corporation enforcement also highlights 
the selective concern with collateral consequences in federal criminal practice. It 
is ironic that corporations benefit from great solicitude regarding the potential 
collateral consequences of a conviction, while individuals, who directly suffer 
such consequences, as defendants or family members of those charged, do not 
benefit from any such systemic policy consideration, even if they serve as the 
whistleblowers for unlawful labor or immigration practices. Indeed, the larger 
effort to regulate workplace screening raises concerns with collateral conse-
quences on employees. Most industries in which immigration-related prosecu-
tions have been brought do not involve white-collar employees or highly paid 
occupations. The use of criminal enforcement in policing those industries raises 
further questions regarding the goals of the immigration strategy, for which crim-
inal prosecutions are intended to provide an added deterrent and punishment, in 
relatively less-privileged workplaces. The dynamic of corporate immigration 
prosecutions provides another example of the way in which federal prosecutors 
conduct large scale enforcement against individuals, but largely decline to pursue 
corporate targets. The problem of “corporate crimmigration” should be critically 
examined and addressed, particularly where the goals of immigration, criminal 
law, and corporate criminal law diverge and collide as never before. 
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APPENDIX: FEDERAL CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS,  
2001–2019 
Company Disposition Jurisdiction Total  
Penalty  
Date 
GSHC Corp. plea 
California - 
Northern  
District 84,000 1/17/01 
Construction  
Personnel, Inc. plea 
Tennessee - 





District 10,000 12/18/01 
Global Staffing 
Services, Inc. plea 
Georgia - 
Northern  
District 57,000 7/30/02 
Janitorial  
Maintenance, Inc. plea 
Georgia - 
Northern  
District 24,000 7/30/02 
Clark's Quality 
Roofing, Inc. plea Colorado 40,000 10/11/02 
East Bernstadt 
Cooperage, Inc. plea 
Kentucky - 
Eastern District 40,000 3/28/03 
CMS of  
Queensbury, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Middle District 10,000 6/4/03 
Trussway Ltd. plea 
Kentucky - 
Western  
District 0 6/5/03 
E. L. Thompson 
Associates, LLC plea 
Tennessee - 
Western  
District 27,000 12/22/03 
Forest Hill, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 10,000 3/15/04 
Bavarian Inn, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 3,000 10/13/04 
3D Poultry  
Loading, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  




Middle District 4,000,000 4/25/05 
Allied Floor Care 
Service, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 





Middle District 0 4/25/05 
Cleanmax  
Associates, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 





Middle District 0 4/25/05 
GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  8:06 PM 
392 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
Express  
Corporate  
Services, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Middle District 0 4/25/05 
Florida Floor 
Care, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 















Middle District 0 4/25/05 
Precision  
Cleaning, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Middle District 0 4/25/05 
World Clean  
Associates, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Middle District 0 4/25/05 
Boeing Tile and 
Marble, Inc. plea 
Florida -  
Middle District 0 7/1/05 
DJR Cleaning 
Enterprises, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Middle District 500,000 10/17/05 
Julie's Cafe plea 
Wisconsin - 
Eastern District 20,000 10/17/05 
China Star, Inc. plea New Mexico 55,000 11/14/05 
White Dairy Ice 
Cream Co., Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 1,000 1/9/06 
PJ Services, LLC plea Kansas 150,000 3/22/06 
Allison Creek 
Sheep Co. plea Idaho 26,000 5/18/06 
Carlson  




Seismic, Inc.) DP 
Texas - South-




Eastern District 75,000 10/24/06 
Narayan, LLC plea 
Kentucky - 
Eastern District 75,000 10/24/06 
Bob Eisel Powder 
Coatings, Inc. plea Kansas 175,000 11/21/06 
Jax China Kings, 
Inc. plea 
Florida -  
Middle District 500 11/30/06 
Stucco Design, 
Inc. plea North Dakota 1,581,072 12/6/06 
Garcia Labor Co. plea 
Ohio - South-
ern District 0 3/2/07 
Garcia Labor Co. 
of Ohio, Inc. plea 
Ohio - South-
ern District 0 3/2/07 
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Yu Hua Co. LLC plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 45,000 3/6/07 
Fenceworks, Inc. plea 
California - 
Southern  
District 4,700,000 4/3/07 
Plastrglas, Inc. plea Nebraska 96,000 4/3/07 
HV Connect, Inc. plea 
Ohio - North-










District 214,500 2/6/08 
Lochirco Fruit 
and Produce, Inc. plea 
Missouri - 
Eastern District 99,000 2/7/08 
Hedges Land-
scape Specialists plea 
Kentucky - 
Western  
District 48,000 3/19/08 
Tenryoan, Inc. plea Hawaii 10,000 4/30/08 
Peabody Corp. plea 
Virginia - East-
ern District 250,000 5/5/08 
Car Care plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Eastern District 100,000 6/25/08 
Spectrum  
Interiors, Inc. plea 
Kentucky - 
Eastern District 0 7/22/08 
Mack Associates, 
Inc. plea Nevada 1,000,000 8/8/08 
ZHU & Partners, 
LLC plea Maryland 50,000 9/26/08 
Republic  
Services, Inc. NP 
Texas - South-




Eastern District 759,071 10/2/08 
Tarrasco Steel 
Company, Inc. plea 
Mississippi - 
Northern  
District 310,512 10/20/08 
IFCO Systems NP 
New York - 
Northern  
District 20,697,317 12/19/08 
Michael Bianco, 
Inc. plea Massachusetts 1,970,000 1/28/09 
Alrek Business 
Solutions, Inc. plea 
Florida - 
Northern  
District 36,000 2/13/09 
Dakota Beef, 
LLC plea South Dakota 45,000 2/26/09 
Janco  
Composites, Inc. plea 
Indiana - 
Northern  
District 210,000 4/23/09 
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Acambaro  
Mexican Restau-
rant, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 250,000 4/30/09 
Garcia's  
Distributor, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 20,000 4/30/09 
Garibaldi  
Mexican  
Restaurant, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 25,000 4/30/09 
Asiana 
Pewaukee, Inc. plea 
Wisconsin - 
Eastern District 32,000 5/18/09 
T & J  
Restaurants, LLC plea 
Missouri - 




ern District 0 8/7/09 
Shipley Do-Nut 
Flour and Supply 
Co., Inc. plea 
Texas - South-
ern District 250,000 8/12/09 
Colmenares  
Rodriguez, Inc. plea Nebraska 0 10/15/09 
Columbia Farms, 
Inc. DP South Carolina 1,500,000 11/3/09 
Mt. Fuji Restau-
rants, Inc. plea 
Mississippi - 
Southern  
District 0 12/1/09 
CCGWA LLC plea North Dakota 40,000 12/15/09 
Flowood  
Partners, LLC plea 
Mississippi - 
Southern  
District 0 12/17/09 
Pilgrim's Pride, 
Inc. NP 
Texas - Eastern 
District 4,500,000 12/30/09 
Wedekemper's 
Construction, Inc. plea 
Illinois - 
Southern  





District 2,500 4/29/10 
Hi Tech  
Trucking, Inc. plea 
Virginia - East-
ern District 100,000 11/24/10 
FC Young & Co. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Eastern District 69,000 2/4/11 
Disabatino Land-
scaping and Tree 
Service, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 




Eastern District 24,000 2/28/11 
Howard  
Industries, Inc. plea 
Mississippi - 
Southern  
District 2,500,000 3/4/11 
BMR Develop-
ment, LLC plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Eastern District 51,000 3/7/11 
GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2021  8:06 PM 
No. 2] CORPORATE CRIMMIGRATION 395 
Down to Earth 
Landscaping plea 
Pennsylvania - 





Eastern District 27,000 3/7/11 
Birker, Inc. plea 
Iowa - North-
ern District 32,000 4/25/11 
All Around  
Landscaping, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 40,000 7/7/11 
Arizona Trailer 
Manufacturing, 
Inc. plea Arizona 15,000 7/13/11 
Eurofresh, Inc. plea Arizona 0 8/30/11 
YCL Corp. plea 
Texas - West-




Eastern District 500,000 11/18/11 
Advanced  
Containment  
Systems, Inc. NP 
Texas - South-
ern District 2,000,000 1/1/12 
Atrium  
Companies, Inc. NP 
Texas - South-
ern District 2,000,000 1/1/12 
Ayala's Family 
Bakery, Inc. plea 
Arkansas - 
Western  
District 157,165 3/28/12 
Herbco Int'l, Inc. plea 
Washington - 
Western  










District 515,110 5/22/12 
Behrmann Meat 
Processing, Inc. plea 
Illinois - 
Southern  
District 55,000 7/2/12 
Behrmann York-
shire Farms plea 
Illinois - 
Southern  
District 55,000 7/2/12 
Brake Landscap-
ing & Lawncare, 
Inc. plea 
Missouri - 
Eastern District 0 9/13/12 
Vector  
Fabrication, Inc. plea 
California - 
Northern  
District 75,000 10/12/12 
Diversified Con-
crete, LLC plea 
Louisiana - 
Eastern District 18,449 10/31/12 
McCalla Corp. plea Kansas 300,000 12/4/12 
Fei Teng, Inc. plea 
Virginia - East-
ern District 0 2/25/13 
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Wazana Brothers 
International, Inc. plea 
California - 
Central District 55,000 3/13/13 
Concrete  
Management 
Corp. plea Colorado 176,500 4/25/13 
TN Job Service, 
Inc. dismissal 
Ohio - North-
ern District 0 4/30/13 
A-1 Homes, LLC plea 
Mississippi - 
Northern  




Eastern District 125,000 12/30/13 
Willco of Houma, 
Inc. plea 
Louisiana - 
Eastern District 125,000 12/30/13 
Premier Paving, 
Inc. plea Colorado 0 2/3/14 
NH Environmen-
tal Group, Inc. plea Indiana 170,000 3/21/14 
C.M. Jones, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Eastern District 25,000 4/10/14 
Triangle Grading 
and Paving, Inc. plea 
North Caro-
lina- Middle  
District 0 11/3/14 
INEK  
Technologies, 
LLC plea Kansas 582,601 11/19/14 
3rd & Bell, LLC plea Arizona 50 11/21/14 
Danny's San Tan, 
LLC plea Arizona 50 11/21/14 
National Car 
Care Develop-
ment Co. plea Arizona 0 11/21/14 
Paradise Village 
Car Care Center, 
Inc. plea Arizona 50 11/21/14 
Twentieth & 
Highland, LLC plea Arizona 50 11/21/14 
Danny's Family 
Companies, LLC plea Arizona 50 11/21/14 
Danny's Family 
Carousel, Inc. plea Arizona 50 11/21/14 
83rd & Union 
Hills, LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
84th & Bell, LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Cross-
roads, LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Happy 
Valley, Inc. plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Manage-
ment Services, 
LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
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Danny's Raintree 
& Northsight, 
LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Scotts-
dale & TB plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Tatum, 
LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Tempe, 
LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Family, 
LP plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
Danny's Family 
Companies II, 
LLC plea Arizona 50 11/24/14 
CORTEC Preci-
sion Sheet Metal, 
Inc. plea 
Texas - West-
ern District 48,000 12/10/14 
Osaka Thai Corp. plea 
Louisiana - 
Eastern District 0 12/10/14 
Shinto Restau-
rant, Inc. plea 
Louisiana - 
Eastern District 0 12/10/14 
Glenview Dairy, 
LLC plea 
New York - 
Western  
District 60,000 5/6/15 
Valley View 
Building Ser-
vices, LLC plea Arizona 0 6/19/15 
Ros's Cabinets II, 
Inc. plea 
Michigan - 
Eastern District 50,000 6/25/15 
Programmer Re-
sources Interna-
tional, Inc. plea 
Missouri - 
Eastern District 100,000 8/13/15 
HW Group, LLC plea South Carolina 1,000,000 3/28/16 
Kearney Hospi-
tality, INC. plea Nebraska 150,000 5/11/16 
L.A. Jumbo 
China Buffet, Inc. plea 
Louisiana - 
Eastern District 0 5/19/16 
DJ Drywall, Inc. plea 
Washington - 
Western  
District 75,000 6/2/16 
Servi-Tek, Inc. plea 
California - 
Southern  
District 20,000 7/1/16 
Mary's Gone 
Crackers, Inc. NP 
California - 
Eastern District 1,500,000 7/15/16 
La Espiga De Oro plea 
Texas - South-
ern District 1,000,000 8/11/17 
Asplundh Tree 
Experts, Co. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Western  
District 95,000,000 9/28/17 
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Clarke's Land-
scaping & 
Lawncare, Inc. plea 
Pennsylvania - 
Eastern District 151,200 10/13/17 
Waste Manage-
ment of Texas NP 
Texas - South-




ern District 1,000,000 11/16/18 
Lin's China Buf-




District 0 4/26/19 
 
 
